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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S PAYMENT OF WILLIAMS'S BENEFITS TO HIM
AT THE ADDRESS OF THE WILLIAMS TRUST COMPLIES WITH
SECTION 34A-2-422 OF THE UTAH CODE.
The Commission argues that section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Code is "plain,

unambiguous, and mandatory."

(Comm'n. Br. at 10.)

Florida Asset Financing

Corporation ("FAFC") agrees that this Court need look no further than the plain language
of the statute to decide this dispute. Because FAFC is not attempting to make a claim on,
garnish, or attach any workers' compensation benefits before payment to Williams, this
Court should reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
A.

FAFC is Not Making a "Claim" Against the Benefits Before Payment
to Williams,

Characterizing FAFC's loan to Williams as, among other things, an "artifice,"
"scheme," and "elaborate plan," the Commission contends that FAFC is making a
"claim" on Williams's compensation before it is paid to him. (Comm'n. Br. at 8-9, 11.)
Despite the Commission's baseless accusations, the Williams Trust and the Irrevocable
Letter of Direction, both of which Williams voluntarily signed, comply with the plain
language of the statute.

Section 34A-2-422 makes "compensation before payment"

exempt from all "claims of creditors." The statute, however, does not define the term
"claim." This Court has defined a "claim" as "the aggregate of operative facts which
give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). This definition of "claim," as

applied to section 34A-2-422, is consistent with the terms surrounding it in the statute —
"attachment" and "execution" — which are remedies available under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to seize or otherwise secure property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64, 69.] See
also Morton Int% Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991) (stating
that "the meaning of questionable words and phrases in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to words or phrases associated with them"). Thus, the question is whether
FAFC is asserting a "right" to receive any portion of Williams's compensation before it is
paid to Williams.

As set forth below, FAFC makes no such claim to any

"[compensation before payment" to Williams. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422.
By enforcing its rights in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, FAFC is not making
a "claim" against any workers' compensation before it is paid to Williams. The subject
of section 34A-2-422 is "compensation." It is "compensation before payment" that is
exempt from claims of creditors. Id. (emphasis added). FAFC does not seek to enforce
any right to receive any portion of Williams's compensation before it is paid to Williams.
Rather, consistent with section 34A-2-422, FAFC merely seeks to have the Commission
send the compensation to Williams at the address of the Williams Trust, in accordance
with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, which Williams himself voluntarily signed.

In its brief, the Commission does not contend that FAFC is attempting to "attach"
or "execute" against any disability benefits before payment.
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Simply stated, FAFC is not making, and has never made, a "claim" against any workers'
compensation benefits before the compensation is paid to Williams.
B,

The Disability Benefits Are Being Paid to Williams,

Next, the Commission argues that the compensation is "never paid to Mr.
Williams, but is remitted directly to Florida Asset."

(Comm'n. Br. at 12.)

The

Commission, however, cites no record support for this assertion. In any event, the statute
requires that compensation be paid to "employees" or their dependents.

Under the

Williams Trust, Williams irrevocably declared that certain benefits be paid to him, not to
FAFC. (R. 116, 128.) Again, FAFC does not receive any funds until after Williams
receives his workers' compensation benefits in care of the Trust. Thus, payment of
Williams's compensation to him, at the address designated in the trust documents,
complies with the language of the statute.
C.

The Commission's Actions in this Case Show that Making Payments to
Williams in Care of the Trust is Consistent With Section 34A-2-422.

As discussed in FAFC's principal brief, the Commission's practice is to send the
compensation to the address designated by the recipient, even if that address is not the
recipient's home address. For over four years, the Commission paid Williams's benefits
to him in care of the Williams Trust. Also, in March 2001, just before Williams filed his
bankruptcy petition, the Commission told FAFC that it intended to comply with
Williams's directions to pay the compensation to him in care of the Williams Trust, as the
Fifth Judicial District Court had ordered him to do. (R. at 38-43.) In the future, if

Williams were to comply with the multiple, unappealed court orders entered against him
by instructing the Commission to send the benefits to him in care of the Williams Trust,
the Commission likely would comply with his instructions.
If one accepts the Commission's argument that payment to Williams in care of the
Williams Trust does not comply with the statute, then one also would expect the
Commission to refuse to send the payments to the Trust address under any circumstances.
Carrying the Commission's argument to its logical conclusion, Williams would have no
power to designate that his payments be sent to him in care of the Trust: the payments
would always be sent to his home address, regardless of Williams's instructions. Yet,
that is not what section 34A-2-422 requires, and that has not been the Commission's
practical interpretation of the statute. The actions of the Commission, which is the entity
charged with administering Utah's workers' compensation laws (Comm'n. Br. at 19),
unequivocally demonstrate that sending Williams's compensation to him in care of the
Williams Trust is consistent with section 34A-2-422.
If the Commission wishes to prevent a beneficiary from having his compensation
sent to him in care of a trust, the Commission must voice its concerns to the Utah
Legislature to enact a more specific, and more stringent, statute exempting benefits after
they are paid to the recipient. See, e.g., Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor
2

The Commission does not argue that Labor Commission Rule 612-1-6(A), which
was cited by the court of appeals, would prohibit payment of Williams's compensation to
him in care of the Williams Trust.
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Comm'n, 2004 UT App 273, f 15, 98 P.3d 436 (citing statutes from other jurisdictions
protecting workers' compensation benefits "before and/or after they are received by the
worker"). See also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah
1980) (stating that if Industrial Commission believed "that the law should be different,
perhaps that should be addressed to the legislature, whose function and prerogative it is to
make changes or clarifications in the law"). As presently enacted, however, section 34A2-422 does not prohibit Williams's compensation to be mailed to him in care of the
Williams Trust, as Williams himself voluntarily directed. Rather, the statute prohibits
only general unsecured creditors from attaching or executing against Williams's
compensation before it is paid to him. Because FAFC is not a general creditor seeking to
make a claim on, attach, or execute against Williams's benefits, this Court should reverse
the court of appeals' decision.
D.

Because the Commission's Arguments Fail to Address the Assignability
of Workers' Compensation Benefits, this Court Should Affirm the
Court of Appeals' Decision that the Statute Does Not Prohibit
Assignments,

As stated above, FAFC did not acquire an assignment of Williams's disability
benefits. Its only "assignment" rights were in the beneficial interest in the Williams
Trust, where the payments to Williams were to be sent pursuant to the Irrevocable Letter
of Direction. (R. at 116-28.) Nowhere in its brief does the Commission address the court
of appeals' analysis regarding the "assignability" of compensation under the statute. It is
"well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not

adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Thus, this Court
should affirm the court of appeals' determination that section 34A-2-422 does not
prohibit "assignments" relating to the payment of workers' compensation benefits. See
Florida Asset Finan. Corp., 2004 UT App 273 at t 14.
II.

ALTHOUGH THE COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER "PUBLIC POLICY"
GIVEN THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, FAFC'S
CONTRACT WITH WILLIAMS IS CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC
POLICY.
Despite

its

acknowledgement

that

section

34A-2-422

is

"clear"

and

"unambiguous," the Commission goes on to argue that "public policy" supports its
position about how the statute should be interpreted. (Comm'n. Br. at 15-19.) When the
language of a statute "'is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy
Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). Thus, "it is
elementary" that this Court does "not seek guidance from legislative history and relevant
policy considerations when the statute is clear and unambiguous." Id.; see also Perrine v.
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) ("Only when we find
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations.").

In light of the statute's unambiguous

language, this Court should decline the Commission's invitation to consider "public
policy" to resolve this dispute.
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Even if this Court considers the Commission's arguments regarding "public
policy," these policy factors support the conclusion that Williams is free to use his
workers' compensation benefits however he chooses.

As this Court has declared,

benefits received under the workers' compensation system may properly be used to
obtain credit and pay creditors. See Parker v. Industrial Comm 'n, 87 Utah 868, 50 P.2d
278, 278 (1935) ("Certainly, there is nothing which prevents an injured employee from
using his compensation to pay his creditors."); see also Sullo v. Cinco Star, Inc., 755 So.
2d 822, 823 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) ("The beneficiary may preserve or squander the
proceeds; he or she is in total control."); Highland Park State Bank v. Salazar, 555
S.W.2d 484, 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that a beneficiary is free to use workers'
compensation benefits "to provide food, shelter and other necessities" or "he may use it
as collateral to secure repayment of a loan"). In this case, Williams chose to use a
portion of his compensation to facilitate a loan transaction with FAFC, an entirely proper
use of his benefits.
The Commission further contends that Utah's workers' compensation laws protect
the "stream of income" to injured workers and that "lump-sum payments" are proper only
in "special circumstances," as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421. (Comm'n.
Br. at 16-17.) In the first instance, the Commission does not argue that FAFC's loan to
Williams constituted a "lump-sum payment" of his workers' compensation benefits that
was subject to approval by the Commission. Indeed, the Trust documents contemplate

that Williams will continue to receive his periodic disability payments, which are made to
Williams in care of the Trustee of the Williams Trust.
Second, in about August 2001, long after this dispute arose, the Commission gave
Williams a six-month advance on his benefits. (R. at 43.) There is no evidence in the
record that any administrative law judge approved the six-month "lump-sum payment" to
Williams. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421 ("An administrative law judge, under
special circumstances and when the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic
benefits to one or more lump-sum payments."). Nor is there any evidence about what
"special circumstances" may have justified such a payment. See id. Thus, under the facts
of this case, the Commission's argument that only "special circumstances" support lumpsum payments is unpersuasive.
Finally, as noted by the New Mexico Supreme Court in interpreting a workers'
compensation statute almost identical to section 34A-2-422, "[i]f the legislature had
intended a 'spendthrift' provision that would preclude the assignment of all or part of the
proceeds before received, such a provision readily could have been articulated." Romero
v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808, 811 (N.M. 1991). Similarly, neither the plain language of section
34A-2-422 nor "public policy" suggests that the Utah Legislature intended anything other
than to protect workers' compensation from involuntary claims, attachment, or execution
by the general creditors of an injured worker.

Again, if the Commission wishes to

prohibit voluntary transactions, such as that entered into between Williams and FAFC, it
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should make its wishes known to the legislature. In sum, the Commission's "public
policy" arguments cannot override the plain language of the statute, which allows
Williams to receive his workers' compensation benefits in care of the Williams Trust.
III.

THE COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS TO REFUSE TO PAY
WILLIAMS'S COMPENSATION TO HIM IN CARE OF THE WILLIAMS
TRUST.
The Commission does not independently address the second issue on this appeal:

whether the Commission itself can be required to "direct payments to a trust for
subsequent transfer to a creditor." As argued in FAFC's principal brief, because the
Commission's payment of workers' compensation benefits to Williams in care of the
Williams Trust does not violate section 34A-2-422, the Commission should have no
concern about paying the benefits in the manner voluntarily prescribed by Williams in his
Irrevocable Letter of Direction. Indeed, the Commission's only stated justification for
refusing to send the benefits to Williams at the Trust address has been its position that
section 34A-2-422 prohibits such action. Section 34A-2-422, however, contains no such
prohibition.
Finally, there is no dispute between Williams and FAFC over the enforceability of
the Williams Trust or the Irrevocable Letter of Direction.

Despite having several

opportunities to voice his objections in three separate Utah courts, Williams has never
challenged the enforceability of these documents. The Default Judgment entered againsl
Williams in this action, which has never been set aside or appealed, permits FAFC to
instruct the Commission to send Williams's benefits to him at the Trust address. (R. at

206-08.) Thus, as the third-party payor of the compensation, the Commission has no
legal basis to refuse to comply with Williams's irrevocable directions to send his
compensation to him in care of the Williams Trust.
CONCLUSION
FAFC respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the court of
appeals. In addition, as requested in its principal brief, FAFC respectfully requests that
the Court remand this case to the court of appeals with instructions to enter an order (1)
affirming the Order and Judgment entered by the district court and (2) remanding the case
to the district court to conduct such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the
Order and Judgment, including augmenting the Judgment entered in favor of FAFC.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of July 2005.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

w-

Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
Matthew L. Moncur
Attorneys for Petitioner, Florida Asset Financing Corporation
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